- skills_hub: validate that uninstall_skill's install_path resolves
inside SKILLS_DIR before calling shutil.rmtree, preventing recursive
deletion of arbitrary directories via poisoned lock.json entries
- skills_hub: include file paths (not just contents) in
bundle_content_hash so swapping filenames between files changes the
hash, strengthening update-detection integrity
- pairing: wrap list_pending() in self._lock so _cleanup_expired() file
writes don't race with concurrent generate_code()/approve_code() calls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
vision_tools.py: _download_image() loads the full HTTP response body into
memory via response.content (line 190) with no Content-Length check and no
max file size limit. An attacker-hosted multi-gigabyte file causes OOM.
Add a 50 MB hard cap: check Content-Length header before download, and
verify actual body size before writing to disk.
hermes_parser.py: tc_data["name"] at line 57 raises KeyError when the LLM
outputs a tool call JSON without a "name" field. The outer except catches
it silently, causing the entire tool call to be lost with zero diagnostics.
Add "name" field validation before constructing the ChatCompletionMessage.
mistral_parser.py: tc["name"] at line 101 has the same KeyError issue in
the pre-v11 format path. The fallback decoder (line 112) already checks
"name" correctly, but the primary path does not. Add validation to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
process_registry.py: _reader_loop() has process.wait() after the try-except
block (line 380). If the reader thread crashes with an unexpected exception
(e.g. MemoryError, KeyboardInterrupt), control exits the except handler but
skips wait() — leaving the child as a zombie process. Move wait() and the
cleanup into a finally block so the child is always reaped.
cron/scheduler.py: _run_job_script() only redacts secrets in stdout on the
SUCCESS path (line 417-421). When a cron script fails (non-zero exit), both
stdout and stderr are returned WITHOUT redaction (lines 407-413). A script
that accidentally prints an API key to stderr during a failure would leak it
into the LLM context. Move redaction before the success/failure branch so
both paths benefit.
skill_commands.py: _build_skill_message() enumerates supporting files using
rglob("*") but only checks is_file() (line 171) without filtering symlinks.
PR #6693 added symlink protection to scan_skill_commands() but missed this
function. A malicious skill can create symlinks in references/ pointing to
arbitrary files, exposing their paths (and potentially content via skill_view)
to the LLM. Add is_symlink() check to match the guard in scan_skill_commands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
prompt_builder.py: The `hidden_div` detection pattern uses `.*` which does not
match newlines in Python regex (re.DOTALL is not passed). An attacker can bypass
detection by splitting the style attribute across lines:
`<div style="color:red;\ndisplay: none">injected content</div>`
Replace `.*` with `[\s\S]*?` to match across line boundaries.
credential_files.py: `_load_config_files()` catches all exceptions at DEBUG level
(line 171), making YAML parse failures invisible in production logs. Users whose
credential files silently fail to mount into sandboxes have no diagnostic clue.
Promote to WARNING to match the severity pattern used by the path validation
warnings at lines 150 and 158 in the same function.
webhook.py: `_reload_dynamic_routes()` logs JSON parse failures at WARNING (line
265) but the impact — stale/corrupted dynamic routes persisting silently — warrants
ERROR level to ensure operator visibility in alerting pipelines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three silent `except Exception` blocks in approval.py (lines 345, 387, 469) return
fallback values with zero logging — making it impossible to debug callback failures,
allowlist load errors, or config read issues. Add logger.warning/error calls that
match the pattern already used by save_permanent_allowlist() and _smart_approve()
in the same file.
In mcp_oauth.py, narrow the overly-broad `except Exception` in get_tokens() and
get_client_info() to the specific exceptions Pydantic's model_validate() can raise
(ValueError, TypeError, KeyError), and include the exception message in the warning.
Also wrap the _wait_for_callback() polling loop in try/finally so the HTTPServer is
always closed — previously an asyncio.CancelledError or any exception in the loop
would leak the server socket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
error_classifier.py: Message-only auth errors ("invalid api key", "unauthorized",
etc.) were classified as retryable=True (line 707), inconsistent with the HTTP 401
path (line 432) which correctly uses retryable=False + should_fallback=True. The
mismatch causes 3 wasted retries with the same broken credential before fallback,
while 401 errors immediately attempt fallback. Align the message-based path to
match: retryable=False, should_fallback=True.
web_tools.py: The _PREFIX_RE secret-detection check in web_extract_tool() runs
against the raw URL string (line 1196). URL-encoded secrets like %73k-1234... (
sk-1234...) bypass the filter because the regex expects literal ASCII. Add
urllib.parse.unquote() before the check so percent-encoded variants are also caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
dingtalk.py: The session_webhook URL from incoming DingTalk messages is POSTed to
without any origin validation (line 290), enabling SSRF attacks via crafted webhook
URLs (e.g. http://169.254.169.254/ to reach cloud metadata). Add a regex check
that only accepts the official DingTalk API origin (https://api.dingtalk.com/).
Also cap _session_webhooks dict at 500 entries with FIFO eviction to prevent
unbounded memory growth from long-running gateway instances.
api_server.py: The X-Hermes-Session-Id request header is accepted and echoed back
into response headers (lines 675, 697) without sanitization. A session ID
containing \r\n enables HTTP response splitting / header injection. Add a check
that rejects session IDs containing control characters (\r, \n, \x00).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. gateway/platforms/slack.py: Replace check-then-set TOCTOU race on
_approval_resolved with atomic dict.pop(). Two concurrent button
clicks could both pass the guard before either set it to True,
causing double resolve_gateway_approval — which can resolve the
WRONG queued approval when multiple are pending for the same session.
2. hermes_state.py: Add WARNING log and proper fallbacks when
json.loads fails on tool_calls (→ []), reasoning_details (→ None),
and codex_reasoning_items (→ None). Previously, failures were
silently swallowed: tool_calls stayed as a raw string (iterating
yields characters, not objects), and reasoning fields were simply
missing from the dict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
