mirror of
https://github.com/getpaseo/paseo.git
synced 2026-10-21 08:42:39 +00:00
Mohamed Boudra
772ff8d6f3
* fix(desktop): preserve Linux sandboxing wherever the host allows it Chromium checks its Linux sandbox before main.js, while package installation probes run as root and miss AppArmor restrictions on desktop users. Choose the launch flags before exec and always install the SUID alternative for native packages. Test published artifacts as an ordinary user with namespaces both denied and allowed; never repair permissions in the smoke harness. * fix(desktop): retain the Linux release build baseline * fix(ci): allow canceled desktop smoke uploads to stop * test(desktop): verify the installed RPM sandbox under AppArmor * fix(ci): resolve packaged desktop dependencies before installation * chore(desktop): keep QA evidence out of the repository
55 lines
2.9 KiB
Smarty
55 lines
2.9 KiB
Smarty
#!/bin/bash
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if type update-alternatives >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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# Remove previous link if it doesn't use update-alternatives
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if [ -L '/usr/bin/${executable}' -a -e '/usr/bin/${executable}' -a "`readlink '/usr/bin/${executable}'`" != '/etc/alternatives/${executable}' ]; then
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rm -f '/usr/bin/${executable}'
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fi
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update-alternatives --install '/usr/bin/${executable}' '${executable}' '/opt/${sanitizedProductName}/${executable}' 100 || ln -sf '/opt/${sanitizedProductName}/${executable}' '/usr/bin/${executable}'
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else
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ln -sf '/opt/${sanitizedProductName}/${executable}' '/usr/bin/${executable}'
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fi
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# Package installation runs as root, whose namespace access says nothing about
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# the desktop user under AppArmor. Always provide Chromium's SUID alternative.
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chown root:root '/opt/${sanitizedProductName}/chrome-sandbox' || exit 1
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chmod 4755 '/opt/${sanitizedProductName}/chrome-sandbox' || exit 1
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if hash update-mime-database 2>/dev/null; then
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update-mime-database /usr/share/mime || true
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fi
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if hash update-desktop-database 2>/dev/null; then
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update-desktop-database /usr/share/applications || true
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fi
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# Install apparmor profile. (Ubuntu 24+)
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# First check if the version of AppArmor running on the device supports our profile.
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# This is in order to keep backwards compatibility with Ubuntu 22.04 which does not support abi/4.0.
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# In that case, we just skip installing the profile since the app runs fine without it on 22.04.
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#
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# Those apparmor_parser flags are akin to performing a dry run of loading a profile.
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# https://wiki.debian.org/AppArmor/HowToUse#Dumping_profiles
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#
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# Unfortunately, at the moment AppArmor doesn't have a good story for backwards compatibility.
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# https://askubuntu.com/questions/1517272/writing-a-backwards-compatible-apparmor-profile
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if apparmor_status --enabled > /dev/null 2>&1; then
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APPARMOR_PROFILE_SOURCE='/opt/${sanitizedProductName}/resources/apparmor-profile'
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APPARMOR_PROFILE_TARGET='/etc/apparmor.d/${executable}'
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if apparmor_parser --skip-kernel-load --debug "$APPARMOR_PROFILE_SOURCE" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
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cp -f "$APPARMOR_PROFILE_SOURCE" "$APPARMOR_PROFILE_TARGET"
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# Updating the current AppArmor profile is not possible and probably not meaningful in a chroot'ed environment.
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# Use cases are for example environments where images for clients are maintained.
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# There, AppArmor might correctly be installed, but live updating makes no sense.
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if ! { [ -x '/usr/bin/ischroot' ] && /usr/bin/ischroot; } && hash apparmor_parser 2>/dev/null; then
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# Extra flags taken from dh_apparmor:
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# > By using '-W -T' we ensure that any abstraction updates are also pulled in.
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# https://wiki.debian.org/AppArmor/Contribute/FirstTimeProfileImport
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apparmor_parser --replace --write-cache --skip-read-cache "$APPARMOR_PROFILE_TARGET"
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fi
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else
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echo "Skipping the installation of the AppArmor profile as this version of AppArmor does not seem to support the bundled profile"
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fi
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fi
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