Carry local files and shared state into new worktrees (#2419)

* feat(server): support symlink worktree includes

* refactor(server): simplify worktree include handling

* fix(server): constrain worktree include traversal

* fix(server): clean up failed worktree branches

* fix(server): skip missing worktree include entries

* fix(server): make worktree includes best effort

* fix(server): skip failed worktree includes

* fix(server): harden worktree include planning

* fix(server): preserve reused worktree result shape

Materialization reports describe one creation attempt, not durable worktree identity. Carry them beside the worktree so newly created and reused results keep the same stable shape.

* fix(server): harden worktree include boundaries

Replace directory snapshots exactly, keep canonical Git metadata protected, report recovery skips, and only roll back branches owned before worktree creation.

* fix(server): follow safe include aliases

Traverse canonical in-checkout directory links during glob planning and treat coded revalidation failures as per-entry skips.

* fix(server): make include preflight race safe

Create fetched checkout refs atomically, retain overlapping copy entries for independent fallback, and protect the full managed-worktree base.

* fix(server): preserve staged recovery state

Validate completed directory snapshots, retain backups after failed restoration, and derive atomic ref guards from the repository object ID width.

* fix(server): preserve partial include progress

Keep safe glob matches, enforce recursive-directory types, validate staged roots, and retain OID guards through rollback.

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Co-authored-by: Mohamed Boudra <boudra.moha@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michael Wu
2026-07-27 20:18:40 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 89c2fac3c6
commit cbbf6c1684
13 changed files with 2721 additions and 141 deletions

View File

@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ The daemon also supports an optional shared-secret password (set via `auth.passw
Connected clients are trusted operators of the daemon user. File previews follow that authority: a preview request may read any regular file the daemon process can read, while keeping path normalization and symlink checks in the daemon file service. Workspace-relative paths remain a UI convenience, not a security boundary.
An explicit `symlink <path>` entry in a repository's .worktreeinclude intentionally gives a
Paseo-created worktree live access to that source-checkout file or directory. It is useful for
local dependencies and caches, but it weakens the usual worktree isolation: agents and lifecycle
scripts can modify the source through the link. Paseo validates entries and refuses traversal or
destination-link escapes, but the linked source is a deliberate shared-data boundary.
If you expose the daemon beyond loopback, such as by binding to `0.0.0.0`, forwarding it through a tunnel or reverse proxy, or publishing it from a Docker container, you are responsible for restricting and securing that access. Setting a password is strongly recommended in that case.
In Docker, the official image runs the daemon and agents as the non-root