fix(security): derive <VENDOR>_API_KEY from host as final credential fallback
After #28660's host-gating fix, users with provider=custom and base_url pointed at a commercial endpoint (DeepSeek, Groq, Mistral, …) hit no-key-required even when they had the vendor-named env var set (DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, GROQ_API_KEY, …). The issue author flagged this as 'what users intuitively expect'. Adds _host_derived_api_key() to derive an env var name from the base URL host using the *registrable* label (second-to-last). Appended to all three api_key_candidates chains (_resolve_named_custom_runtime direct-alias path, named-custom path, _resolve_openrouter_runtime non-openrouter branch). Lookalike resistance: api.deepseek.com.attacker.test resolves to vendor label 'attacker', NOT 'deepseek' — DEEPSEEK_API_KEY stays put. IPs and loopback yield no vendor label. Already-handled vendors (OPENAI/OPENROUTER/ OLLAMA) are filtered to prevent bypass of the explicit host-gated paths. Adds 6 tests covering positive paths (DeepSeek, Groq), the lookalike attack, loopback rejection, the already-handled-vendor filter, and direct helper unit tests. Also adds erhnysr to AUTHOR_MAP.
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@@ -100,6 +100,63 @@ def _detect_api_mode_for_url(base_url: str) -> Optional[str]:
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return None
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def _host_derived_api_key(base_url: str) -> str:
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"""Look up `<VENDOR>_API_KEY` in the env, derived from the base URL host.
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Examples:
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https://api.deepseek.com/v1 → DEEPSEEK_API_KEY
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https://api.groq.com/openai/v1 → GROQ_API_KEY
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https://api.mistral.ai/v1 → MISTRAL_API_KEY
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https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/openai/ → GOOGLEAPIS_API_KEY
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Returns the env value (stripped) or "". Never returns env vars whose names
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are already explicitly checked elsewhere — those are handled by their own
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host-gated paths (OPENAI/OPENROUTER/OLLAMA).
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The vendor label is the *registrable* portion of the hostname: strip
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``api.`` / ``www.`` prefixes, then take the second-to-last label
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(``api.deepseek.com`` → ``deepseek``). Falls back to "" for hostnames
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that don't yield a usable vendor label (IPs, loopback, single-label
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hosts).
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"""
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hostname = base_url_hostname(base_url)
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if not hostname:
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return ""
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# Reject IPv4 / IPv6 / loopback — no meaningful vendor label.
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if any(ch.isdigit() for ch in hostname.split(".")[-1]):
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# Last label starts with a digit → likely IP. (TLDs are never numeric.)
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return ""
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if hostname in ("localhost",) or ":" in hostname:
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return ""
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labels = [lbl for lbl in hostname.split(".") if lbl]
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# Strip common API/CDN prefixes.
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while labels and labels[0] in ("api", "www"):
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labels.pop(0)
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if len(labels) < 2:
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return ""
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# Take the *registrable* label (second-to-last). For typical provider
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# hosts this is what users intuitively call "the vendor":
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# deepseek.com → labels[-2] = "deepseek" ✓
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# api.groq.com → groq.com → labels[-2] = "groq" ✓
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# api.mistral.ai → labels[-2] = "mistral" ✓
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# Crucially, lookalike hosts pick the ATTACKER's label, not the spoofed
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# vendor:
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# api.deepseek.com.attacker.test → labels[-2] = "attacker"
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# so DEEPSEEK_API_KEY stays put and the chain falls through to
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# no-key-required. This mirrors how `base_url_host_matches` resists the
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# same lookalike attack for explicit hosts.
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vendor = labels[-2]
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# Sanitize to env var charset: A-Z, 0-9, underscore.
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sanitized = "".join(ch if ch.isalnum() else "_" for ch in vendor).upper()
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if not sanitized or not sanitized[0].isalpha():
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return ""
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# Don't re-derive env vars already handled by explicit host-gated paths.
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if sanitized in ("OPENAI", "OPENROUTER", "OLLAMA"):
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return ""
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env_name = f"{sanitized}_API_KEY"
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return (os.getenv(env_name, "") or "").strip()
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def _auto_detect_local_model(base_url: str) -> str:
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"""Query a local server for its model name when only one model is loaded."""
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if not base_url:
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@@ -589,6 +646,10 @@ def _resolve_named_custom_runtime(
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# Gate env key fallbacks on authoritative hosts (#28660)
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(os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "").strip() if _da_is_openai_url else ""),
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(os.getenv("OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "").strip() if _da_is_openrouter else ""),
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# Bonus (#28660): derive `<VENDOR>_API_KEY` from the host so users
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# who set DEEPSEEK_API_KEY / GROQ_API_KEY / MISTRAL_API_KEY get the
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# intuitive match without configuring `custom_providers` first.
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_host_derived_api_key(base_url),
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]
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api_key = next(
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(c for c in api_key_candidates if has_usable_secret(c)),
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@@ -634,6 +695,9 @@ def _resolve_named_custom_runtime(
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# OPENAI_API_KEY to a local-llm endpoint leaks credentials (#28660).
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(os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "").strip() if _cp_is_openai_url else ""),
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(os.getenv("OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "").strip() if _cp_is_openrouter else ""),
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# Bonus (#28660): derive `<VENDOR>_API_KEY` from the host as a final
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# fallback when key_env wasn't set explicitly.
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_host_derived_api_key(base_url),
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]
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api_key = next((candidate for candidate in api_key_candidates if has_usable_secret(candidate)), "")
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@@ -749,6 +813,11 @@ def _resolve_openrouter_runtime(
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(os.getenv("OLLAMA_API_KEY") if _is_ollama_url else ""),
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(os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY") if (_is_openai_url or _is_openai_azure) else ""),
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(os.getenv("OPENROUTER_API_KEY") if _is_openrouter_url else ""),
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# Bonus (#28660): derive `<VENDOR>_API_KEY` from the host so users
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# who set DEEPSEEK_API_KEY / GROQ_API_KEY / MISTRAL_API_KEY get the
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# intuitive match. Helper returns "" for IPs/loopback and for env
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# vars already handled by the explicit host-gated paths above.
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_host_derived_api_key(base_url),
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]
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api_key = next(
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(str(candidate or "").strip() for candidate in api_key_candidates if has_usable_secret(candidate)),
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