diff --git a/tests/gateway/test_discord_bot_auth_bypass.py b/tests/gateway/test_discord_bot_auth_bypass.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..29e6a8899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/gateway/test_discord_bot_auth_bypass.py
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+"""Regression guard for #4466: DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS works without DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS.
+
+The bug had two sequential gates both rejecting bot messages:
+
+  Gate 1 — `on_message` in gateway/platforms/discord.py ran the user-allowlist
+  check BEFORE the bot filter, so bot senders were dropped with a warning
+  before the DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS policy was ever evaluated.
+
+  Gate 2 — `_is_user_authorized` in gateway/run.py rejected bots at the
+  gateway level even if they somehow reached that layer.
+
+These tests assert both gates now pass a bot message through when
+DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS permits it AND no user allowlist entry exists.
+"""
+
+import os
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from gateway.session import Platform, SessionSource
+
+
+# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Gate 2: _is_user_authorized bypasses allowlist for permitted bots
+# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _make_bare_runner():
+    """Build a GatewayRunner skeleton with just enough wiring for the auth test.
+
+    Uses ``object.__new__`` to skip the heavy __init__ — many gateway tests
+    use this pattern (see AGENTS.md pitfall #17).
+    """
+    from gateway.run import GatewayRunner
+    runner = object.__new__(GatewayRunner)
+    # _is_user_authorized reads self.pairing_store.is_approved(...) before
+    # any allowlist check succeeds; stub it to never approve so we exercise
+    # the real allowlist path.
+    runner.pairing_store = SimpleNamespace(is_approved=lambda *_a, **_kw: False)
+    return runner
+
+
+def _make_discord_bot_source(bot_id: str = "999888777"):
+    return SessionSource(
+        platform=Platform.DISCORD,
+        chat_id="123",
+        chat_type="channel",
+        user_id=bot_id,
+        user_name="SomeBot",
+        is_bot=True,
+    )
+
+
+def _make_discord_human_source(user_id: str = "100200300"):
+    return SessionSource(
+        platform=Platform.DISCORD,
+        chat_id="123",
+        chat_type="channel",
+        user_id=user_id,
+        user_name="SomeHuman",
+        is_bot=False,
+    )
+
+
+def test_discord_bot_authorized_when_allow_bots_mentions(monkeypatch):
+    """DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=mentions must authorize a bot sender even when
+    DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS is set and the bot's ID is NOT in it.
+
+    This is the exact scenario from #4466 — a Cloudflare Worker webhook
+    posts Notion events to Discord, the Hermes bot gets @mentioned, and
+    the webhook's bot ID is not (and shouldn't be) on the human
+    allowlist.
+    """
+    runner = _make_bare_runner()
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", "mentions")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", "100200300")  # human-only allowlist
+
+    source = _make_discord_bot_source(bot_id="999888777")
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(source) is True
+
+
+def test_discord_bot_authorized_when_allow_bots_all(monkeypatch):
+    """DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=all is a superset of =mentions — should also bypass."""
+    runner = _make_bare_runner()
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", "all")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", "100200300")
+
+    source = _make_discord_bot_source()
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(source) is True
+
+
+def test_discord_bot_NOT_authorized_when_allow_bots_none(monkeypatch):
+    """DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=none (default) must still reject bots that aren't
+    in DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS — preserves the original security behavior.
+    """
+    runner = _make_bare_runner()
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", "none")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", "100200300")
+
+    source = _make_discord_bot_source(bot_id="999888777")
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(source) is False
+
+
+def test_discord_bot_NOT_authorized_when_allow_bots_unset(monkeypatch):
+    """Unset DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS must behave like 'none'."""
+    runner = _make_bare_runner()
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", "100200300")
+
+    source = _make_discord_bot_source(bot_id="999888777")
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(source) is False
+
+
+def test_discord_human_still_checked_against_allowlist_when_bot_policy_set(monkeypatch):
+    """DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=all must NOT open the gate for humans — they
+    still need to be in DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS (or a pairing approval).
+    """
+    runner = _make_bare_runner()
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", "all")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS", "100200300")
+
+    # Human NOT on the allowlist → must be rejected.
+    source = _make_discord_human_source(user_id="999999999")
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(source) is False
+
+    # Human ON the allowlist → accepted.
+    source_allowed = _make_discord_human_source(user_id="100200300")
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(source_allowed) is True
+
+
+def test_bot_bypass_does_not_leak_to_other_platforms(monkeypatch):
+    """The is_bot bypass is Discord-specific — a Telegram bot source with
+    is_bot=True must NOT be authorized just because DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=all.
+    """
+    runner = _make_bare_runner()
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS", "all")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", "100200300")
+
+    telegram_bot = SessionSource(
+        platform=Platform.TELEGRAM,
+        chat_id="123",
+        chat_type="channel",
+        user_id="999888777",
+        is_bot=True,
+    )
+    assert runner._is_user_authorized(telegram_bot) is False